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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiciton in this matter pursuant to Section
78-2a-3(2)(i) of theUtah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court's formula for determining the equitable division of the

parties interest in the real property in question, based on the evidence provided
to the court at trial, a misapplication of the law as Appellant claims.
The standard of appellate review is correction of error, Orton v. Carter,
970 P.2d 1254, (Utah 1998) and breadth of judicial discretion of trial court
judges.
2.

When the value of the real property in question and equitably dividing up

interests in that real proprety was pled for and on notice to both parties that it
would be an issue at trial, can the Appellant rightfully complain abuse of
discretion by the judge for using one of the alternative valuations available to it
from the trial to determine equity, and when the fault for not having Appellant's
preferred valuation in evidence for the court to determine value was the sole
fault of Appellant.
The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion, Crookston v. Fire
Ins. Exchange, 860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
1

None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Plaintiffs Complaint filed on or about September 29, 1999, sought

the Court's determination of the parties7 interest in a residence upon real
property on three separate bases: (a) dissolution of partnership and determination
of equitable partnership shares; (b) quiet title on the basis of adverse possession;
and (c) that defendant had no interest in said property and her name was on the
Deed solely as an accommodation to plaintiff. Plaintiff further alleged in their
complaint that Plaintiff had sole use of the property for many years, that
Defendant had abandoned her interest in the property and had failed to
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance or upkeep of the
property. (Record at pages 1-6) (the copy of Plaintiffs complaint attached to
the brief received by counsel from Appellant was missing page 3. Therefore,
the full complaint is attached hereto).
2.

Defendant answered, admitted that the parteis were in a partnership

with respect to the real property, and denied all other allegations, and requested
the Court to order the property sold and the equity divided equally between the
parties. (Record at pages 7-8).

2

3.

A trial on the issues was held on June 6, 2000, and the Court

entered Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order Quiteting Title
in Plaintiff Dan Lee July 31, 2000. (Record at pages 52-56 and unnumbered
attachment to Appellant's brief of Findings and Judgment).
4.

Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment August 9, 2000,

which was objected to in writing by Plaintiff. (See attachment to Appellant's
brief and attachment of Plaintiffs response and objection attached to Appellee's
brief).
5.

The Court issued an Order on Defendant's Motion denying the same

October 12, 2000. (See attachment to Appellant's brief).
6.

Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal October 19, 2000, from a

final Order entered in the Fourth District Court, Utah County.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a.

Plaintiff and defendant began living together in August of 1993 and

lived together until October of 1996, at which time they separated. (Findings,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quiteting Title, paragraph 1).
b.

At first the parties lived with plaintiffs mother, but then in

September of 1994, plaintiff and defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower
for the purchase of the home located in American Fork, Utah, and lived together
in this home until their separation.

(Findings, J and OQT, paragraph 1).
3

c.

Plaintiff had intended on purchasing this home in his own name but

couldn't qualify for a loan (even though he was working at the time) because of
a recent layoff. Plaintiff therefore asked Defendant to co-sign which she did but
Plaintiff had to pay off some of her debts so she could qualify.

The total

down payment of over $7,000.00 came from Plaintiff funds solely.

(Record at

pages 68-69).
d.

The parties did not hold themselves out as husband and wife.

(Findings of Fact, J and OQT, paragraph 1).
e.

The parties signed documents indicating a joint tenancy status

though always holding themselves out as unmarried, at all times.

Plaintiff had

a poor education and did not even understand what a trust deed was or what
joint tenancy meant and that he felt she was signing just to help him and didn't
comprehend she was obtaining an interest in his property.. (Record at pages 6972).
f. The total purchase price for the property was $58,395.26 and $6,995.26
was paid as a down payment leaving a total balance due of $51,296.7. None of
the down payment was paid by Defendant Dora. (Record at pages 55-56 and
Findings, J and OQT, paragraph 2).
g. Though disputed, the court found in it's Findings that during the two
year period the parties were together in this home they pooled their incomes
4

during the time that each was employed for the benefit of the each other, and
paying the monthly mortgage on the home, either from funds contained in a
joint bank account or from Defendant's separate bank account. (Findings and J
and OQT, paragraph 3).
h.

Though a little home, plaintiff testified he did almost all the repairs

and rennovations himself and paid for materials with his money and with little
or any help from Defendant. (Record at pages 79-85). Defendant disputed this.
i.

The Court found that regardless of what labels are put on the theory

of recovery, as claimed in this case by the Parties, i.e., contract, partnership or
quasi-marital relationship, the court finds that the Plaitniff and Defendant for
purposes of purchasing the property in question held themselves out as joint
tenants purchasing the property together,

(unnumbered pages Findings,

Judgment, OQT, paragraph 4).
j.

After payment of the down payment by Plaintiff, the beginning

balance of the amount due for the purchase of the property was $51,296.75.
That the balance due on the mortgage when Defendant left was $50,135.78.
That the difference between the purchase price and the price at the time
Defendant left is the equity established by payments made.

That neither party

put on any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to appreciation in
value of the property fromthe time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the time of
5

separation, nor from the time of purchasse to the time of trial, (unnumbered
page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 5).
k. Defendant attempted at trial to introduce an appraisal at trial but could
not overcome a hearsay objection having not bothered to subpoena any relevant
witnesses who could testify and be cross-examined, and no appraisal was
therefore received by the court.

(Record at pages 51-53).

1. The Court found that the only way the Court had of determining any
equity in the property that is subject to distribution is to determine the purchase
price and compare it to the balance due on a specific date, namely the
separation of the parties, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT,
paragraph 6, and Exhibits 23 and 16).
m.

The Court found that after the time of separation, Plaintiff continued

to reside in the home and pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes and
insurance. No moneys were paid by the Defendant from October 31,1996 to the
time of trial, (unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 7).
n.

The Court found that considering the evidence, and based upon the

principles of equity (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 30-2-6 (1999), and partnership, the
Parties, though unmarried (UCA SEc. 30-1-4.5), should share equally in the
amount of equity found by the Court.

Therefore, the Court divided the

$1,160.97 found in mortgage reduction as set forth in Fact j above equally
6

between the parties,

(unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT,

paragraph 9).
0. The equity established in the property by evidence is $1,160.97, and
defendant is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her equity in the property,
(unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 8-10).
p. The Court quieted title to the property in Plaintiffs name against the
Defendant,

(unnumbered page, Findings, Judgment and OQT, paragraph 11).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. That it was not improper in any way for the trial court to determine the
amount of the home's equity using the evidence placed before him and by the
means he used of reduction of mortgage, inasmuch as, contrary to Appellant's
assertions, the trial court ruled that the "value of the real property and it's
equity were pled by both parties", and evidence was presented to give the court
a basis for their ruling.
2.

That dividing up a partnership, and making an equitable division of

the same are, obviously, equitable issues for which the trial court has a broad
discretion, after listening to the testimony and taking evidence, to fashion an
equitable remedy.
7

ARGUMENT

I.

THAT IT WAS NOT IMPROPER IN ANY WAY FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO

DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF THE HOME'S EQUITY USING THE EVIDENCE PLACED
BEFORE HIM AND BY THE MEANS HE USED OF REDUCTION OF MORTGAGE,
INASMUCH AS, CONTRARY TO APPELLANT'S ASSERTIONS, THE TRIAL COURT
RULED THAT THE "VALUE OF THE REAL PROPERTY AND IT'S EQUITY WERE PLED"
BY BOTH PARTIES, AND EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED TO GIVE THE COURT A BASIS
FOR IT'S RULING.

APPELLANT relies in her argument on the assertion that it was improper
for the trial judge to determine equity because it was not pled or on notice to
the parties.

The trial judge, however, in his Order on Appellant's Motion to

Amend the Judgment made a specific finding that the matter of equity and the
value of the equity in the home was pled and at issue and that the parties were
on notice as to the same.

"Both the Plaintiffs Complaint and Defendant's

Answer put at issue the value of the real property at issue in the lawsuit. Thus,
both parties were on notice by reason of the pleadings that the value of the real
property and its' equity would be questions to be addressed at the time of trial.
Based upon the evidence presented by the parties at trial, a determination was
made by the Court as to equity as stated in the Court's Findings of Fact.
8

Therefore, in accordance with that evidence, the Court's determination was
proper and equitable. . ." .

(See Order on Appellant's Motion dated 12

October, 2000, attached to Appellant's brief, and copy of Answer of Defendant
attached to Appellant's brief and full copy of Plaintiffs complaint attached
hereto to Appellee's brief.)
While the trial judge in his Findings makes the statement that "neither
party presented any evidence of appreciation in value of the property. . ." the
record reveals that Plaintiff/Appellee in fact presented two pieces of evidence
that gave the court two valid ways of determining equity and in fact the trial
court used one of them..

The first, as acknowledged in Appellants brief was a

county valuation notice for 1999, Exhibit 12 showing a value in 1999 of $80,
157.00.

The second were Exhibits 23 and 16 referred to in the trial court's

Findings (para. 5), which showed the beginning balance on the mortgage and
the payments made till time of separation and the balance at time of separation.
The trial court also in it's Order of denial of Defendant's Motion to Amend
stated that it was aware of other alternative valuation approaches but felt uner
the circumstances and with the evidence before it that the reduction of mortgage
method was best.

Therefore the trial court had several alternative in mind,

and had at least two viable items of competent evidence upon which to place a
valuation of the equity in the property.
9

The trial judge chose to use the

evidence presented as to mortgage payments made and reduction in mortgage
amount and found it the most equitable means of determining the fair
partnership interest of the parties in the property based on their equitable
contributions. (Order on Defendant's Motion, para. 1, attached to Appellant's
brief).
We have here a case where, contrary to Appellant's assertions, the issue of
valuation and equity was pled by both parties (according to the trial court's
findingds in the Order On Defendant's Motion, para. 2), and at issue and on
notice to both parties. Where Plaintiff was the only one that gave the court any
basis upon which to make a ruling and whereby the court chose the mortgage
payments valuation method urged by Plaintiff.

Contrary to Appellants

assertion that they were not on notice as to valuation issues, the record reveals
that Appellant attempted to put in evidence an alleged appraisal from the time
shortly after Appellant left the home.

Appellant failed to subpoena any

witnesses to testify about the appraisal and to be cross examined on the same
and justifiably failed to overcome a hearsay objection as to the appraisal.
(Record at pages 51 and 52).

Because, of this error, Appellant sought by way

of Motion to Amend to get a second bite at the apple which was denied and has
now appealed seeking yet another opportunity.
proceed on evidence before it and Appellant
10

The trial court can only
should have to bear the results of

a failure to adequately

present their case when the opportunity was given and

they were on notice.
SINCE the matters of equity distribution and valuation were pled and the
parties were on notice of the same, the trial court had every right to determine
equity and did not do so improperly, and its decision should not be disturbed.

n.

THAT DIVIDING UP A PARTNERSHIP, AND MAKING AN EQUITABLE

DIVISION OF THE SAME ARE, OBVIOUSLY, EQUITABLE ISSUES FOR WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT HAS A BROAD DISCRETION, AFTER LISTENING TO THE TESTIMONY AND
TAKING EVIDENCE, TO FASHION AN
EQUITABLE REMEDY.

Defendant/Appellant cites the Berger case (Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d
695, 699 (Utah 1985)), for the proposition that a trial judge who uses
inconclusive or improper evidence to determine value may be corrected on
appeal.

The re-valuation Appellant speaks of in the Berger case actually was

related to stock valuations and had nothing to do with real property.

That same

case does however deal with real property valuations at a different point where
the court said, ''The defendant further contends that certain pieces of real
property which were awarded to the plaintiff were undervalued. We have
examined these valuations and refrain from disturbing any of them since all
11

were based on competent evidence. Their value was in issue at the trial, and the
court, within its' rightful discretion, and in each instance adopted the valuation
urged by the plantiff." (Berger v. Berger, 713 P.2d 695, 699 (Utah 1985)).
Appellant has set forth no evidence that the valuations and valuation
methods before the court were either inconclusive, improper or inadmissible.
They were properly before the court as set forth above and the trial judge had
every right, if he felt it was in the interest of equity overall to use them as a
means of dividing up the interests of the parties.
It should be kept in mind, that the trial court is generally given great
discretion in property division cases.

(Thompson v. Thompson, 709 P.2d 360

(Utah, 1985); Godfrey v. Godfrey, 854 P.2d 585, Utah App., 1993) Also note
Lafavi v. Bertoch, 994 P2d. 817, Utah App (2000), where the proposition is
supported that the same equitable powers of the divorce court to determine the
equitable interests of parties to assets in a divorce is also within the discretion
of trial judges in equitably dividing partnership interests, and that the trial court
has a presumption of validitiy.

"When a reasonable basis exists for the trial

court's award of damages, this court will affirm the damage award on appeal.
See Gillmorv. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 (Utah CtApp.1987), c e r t ,
fUtah 1988^

see also

denied,

765 R2d 1278

Breinholt v. Breinholt 905 P.2d 877. 882 (Utah Ct.App.1995)

(explaining that trial court's actions regarding valuation of
property interests entitled to presumption of validity)." Lafavi
12

v. Bertoch.

The trial court is in the best position to weigh

all the testimony and to determine what is, overall, the most
equitable result and division of property.
In this case the trial court heard the disputed testimony
about who performed and paid for the majority of the improvements
to the property; about how

Appellee paid the entire down payment

from his proceeds (Record at page 11);

disputed testimony on

the relative incomes of the parties and contributions to the
home, and on their intentions relative to who really owned the
property and what Appellee's intentions were in having Appellant
sign on the property with her; and how Appellant abandoned the
relationship after only being in the home 2 years. (Record at
page 71).
The judge heard all the testimony as set forth in the record
and weighed it accordingly, and then, on the basis of competent
evidence before it, made a decision as to the valuation and the
equitable division thereof that the trial court felt served the
ends of justice and equity.

Appellant has provided no valid

reasons or reasoning why this decision of the trial court should
be disturbed and the same should be sustained by this Court.

CONCLUSION
The trial court did not improperly apply the law or abuse
it's discretion in any way by dividing up the equitable interests
of the parties in the home as it did.

After hearing all

evidence and testimony, the court has broad discretion in
fashioning a remedy and the method chosen by the trial court is
13

based on competent evidence and is not error or abuse of
discretion.

The trial courts decision should be left

undisturbed and affirmed.
DATED this ^ j T day of June, 2001.

Ralph C. Amott, Attorney for Plaintiff

Mailing Certificate
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
mailed, postage prepaid, this.^^ day of June, 2001 to the
following:
Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendant
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057

^

.
/
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RALPH C. AMOTT, (#0068)
DONALD D. GILBERT (#6733)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 E 100 So., STE 102
PROVO UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-6575
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601
DAN F. LEE,

]
Plaintiff,

vs.

]i

COMPLAINT

]

DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, ]
and John Does 1-10,
Defendants.

]i

Civil No.99- £)</^ OJW

Z %

]

COMES NOW plaintiff and complains of Defendants, and for cause
of action alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Equitable dissolution and division of partnership property
and/or judgment for contribution and payments of Plaintiff)

1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County,
State of Utah.
2. That the property that is the subject of this lawsuit is
located in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah
and is more particularly described as follows:
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF

BLOCK 10, PLAT A, OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET;
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
AREA: 0.30 ACRES.
3.
In 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a
partnership by becoming record owners of the subject property
described above as unmarried individuals.
4.
Plaintiff and Defendant cohabitated at the subject
property from 1994 to November 1996.
5. In November 1996, Defendant abandoned Plaintiff and the
property, left the state for a period of time, and married, having
no further contact with Plaintiff or the property.
6.
That Plaintiff has been paying the taxes, mortgage
payments, costs of repair, maintenance and has made improvements on
the subject property for each and every year since the acquisition
in 1994 and resides there today.
7. At no time since the acquisition in 1994 has Defendant
made any contributions, or only nominal ones, towards payment of
the mortgage, costs of repair, maintenance, improvements, insurance
or taxes on the subject property.
8. That Defendant has breached the partnership agreement by
abandoning the premises and by failing to make contribution or
reimbursing for the same and the partnership should therefore be
dissolved and the property
distributed to Plaintiff in its
entirety.
9.
That Plaintiff has sought to refinance the subject
property but Defendant's name on the property is a cloud thereon
preventing refinance or sale and Defendant has refused and ignored
requests to remove her name or assign over title or even to make an

2

equitable distribution of equity in the property based on fair
contribution ratios of the parties to the partnership.
10. That Plaintiff seeks and is entitled to an order of this
court dissolving the partnerhsip of the parties, to an accounting
and determination of all partnership proceeds and contributions,
and to an order determining the relative equitable value of each
parties contribution to the investment property, which Plaintiff
believes should be a finding of 100% interest in the property to
Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant.
11. Plaintiff is also entitled to have an order of this court
removing Defendants name from the property and awarding free and
clear title to him, or in the alternative granting Plaintiff a
judgment against Defendant for all contributions, payments,
improvements and such as he has made on this property, all as may
be proven at trial.
12. Plaintiff reserves the right to identify the John Does,
if any, listed above who have or may claim an interest in this
property due to encumbrances placed thereon by Defendant, if any,
of which Plaintiff is not aware, and Plaintiff asserts his interest
in the subject property herein to be superior to all other
interests of Defendant or any John Does to be hereafter identified.
13.
Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and
attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this action

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(QUIET TITLE)
14.
herein.

Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth

3

15• Plaintiff has had actual, continuous possession and made
open, exclusive and notorious use of the property for the last
three (3) years. Said use has been under claim of right and/or
title, adverse and hostile to any interest that Defendant may
assert in the property.
16. That based on Plaintiff's sole use of the property for
many years, and Defendant's abandonment thereof, and her failure to
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance, or
upkeep of the property in question, and the fact that this is, and
always was, simply what the parties considered a partnership or
investment based on relative contribution to the purchase and
upkeep of the property, and based on all other allegations
heretofore set forth, that Plaintiff is entitled to an order
Quieting Title to said property in Plaintiff, free and clear of any
interest or claim of Defendant or any other person.
17. That Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this quiet title
action.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(ACCOMODATION)
18.
Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth
herein.
19. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that the taking of
this property in Defendant's name jointly with Plaintiff, was done
solely as an accomodation to Plaintiff by Defendant.
20.
That defendant knew, or should have known, that she
claimed no interest in this property and that her subsequent
behavior after taking title jointly with Plaintiff attests to this
understanding in that she made no contribution to the mortgage,
4

improvements, taxes or any other aspect of maintaining this home,
that she abandoned the same after only a short time and has
continuously abandoned it for many years.
21. That equitably Plaintiff is entitled to all equity that
has accrued in this home since its purchase based on his sole
contributions thereto, and the fact that Defendant's taking joint
title with him was a mere accomodation and intended by the parties
to endow no interest or claim on the property in Defendant.
22. That Plaintiff is entitled therefore to an order removing
Defendant's name from this property and awarding it free and clear
to Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in
prosecuting this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant
Branin, and all other John Does as may be identified and added
hereafter, as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an order of this court dissolving the partnerhsip of
the parties, to an accounting and determination of all partnership
proceeds and contributions, and to an order determining the
relative equitable value of each parties contribution to the
investment property, which Plaintiff believes should be a finding
of 100% interest in the property to Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant.
2. For an order of this court removing Defendant's name from
the property and awarding free and clear title to him, or in the
alternative granting Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for all
contributions, payments, improvements and such as he has made on
this property, all as may be proven at trial.
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3. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title,
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others,
4.
For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting this action
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an Order of this Court quieting title to the subject
property in Plaintiff solely,
2. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title,
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others.
3.
For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting this action

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an Order of this court that Plaintiff is entitled to
an order removing Defendant's name from this property as being
solely an accomodation signer, and awarding it free and clear to
Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in
prosecuting this action.
DATED this

^

day of September, 1999

Ralph
Amott,
Donald D. Gilbert,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6

RALPH C. AMOTT (#68)
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 377-6575
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 64601
DAN F. LEE,
Plaintiff,
vs.

]
>
]>
)
]I

OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO AMEND JUDGMENT
AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS
AND AUTHORITIES

DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN, ]
and John Does 1-10,
])

Civil No.9904-03528

Defendants.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through his attorneyfs
undersigned, and objects to that Motion to Amend Judgment filed
by Defendant in this matter on the following grounds and for the
following reasons:
MEMORANDUM
Defendant's Motion to Amend filed herein is defective both
procedurally and sustantively and should be denied. Following
are the grounds and basis for this conclusion:
Procedural Defects:
1. Defendant has brought this motion under Rule 59(e) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 59e deals with altering
or amending judgments and is vague in it's application at best.
On it's face it would seem to apply more to correction of obvious
mistakes such as correction of figures improperly typed or
listed, correction of sentences that are unclear or non-sensical,
correction of contradictory references that either are not what
1

the court stated or make unclear what the court stated; or other
obvious errors. There is even case law supporting the
proposition that this vague 59e is in actuality only a
restatement of the time limit for 59a New Trial motions and must
contain allegations that fall within the categories listed above
for 59a motions. In Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590
P2d 309, at page 311 the court stated:
"Subdivision (e) of Rule 59 provides a time limitation for
this type of motion, which is directed to the Court for rehearing
of it's own judgment. Such motions must be based on one or more
of the grounds set forth in subdivision (a)." (Utah 1979).

A careful reading of the memorandum of Defendant, and
especially tha first two paragraphs, makes it clear that what
Defendant is actually doing is either objecting to the proposed
Findings and Conclusions of Law and Judgment; or she is
requesting a new trial which should have been brought under rule
59a.
a. If this is more properly construed as an objection to
proposed Findings and Judgment then Defendant's motion is
untimely.
After the Courtfs Ruling in this matter was received
in early July, Counsel undersigned prepared the proposed
Findings, Consclusions and Judgment as ordered and mailed them to
Counsel Chuntz for the Defendant on July 7, 2000, as the mailing
certificate indicates. Within the 8 days ( 5 + 3 ) allowed for
objection under the Rules of Judicial Administration (4-504(2)),
Defendant Chuntz failed to respond with an objection or to sign
off on the proposed judgment "Approved as to Form".
The
judgment was therefore filed with the court around July 21 and
the Court sigrxed and entered the Judgment July 31.
By failing to timely object to the proposed findings
and judgment, Defendant has lost their right to object to the
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same and Defendant is trying to extend this cut-off time by
questionable use of Rule 59e.
b. If this motion is more properly construed as a request
for New Trial than it fails as well because none of the
requirements under Rule 59a have been met or even alleged by
Defendant. They have not alleged (a) irregularity of the
proceedings, (b) misconduct of jury-or court, (c) accident or
suprise which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against,
(d) newly discovered evidence, (e) excessive or inadequate
damages appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice, (f) insufficiency of evidence to justify
the verdict or that it is against law, and (g) error in law.
None of these factors apply in this case and none were alleged by
Defendant.
In addition 59a is subject to the over-riding considerations
of Rule 61 which states:
ft

No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal
to take such action is to appear inconsistent with
substantial justice. The Court at every stage of the
proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceedings which does not affect the substantial rights of
the parties.ff
The arguments of Defendant in her memorandum reveal or
allege no basis under rule 59a or rule 61 that would require or
even justify this court in granting a new trial or allowing new
evidence. No error in leasoning of the court or of factual
findings set forth has been alleged other than Defendant's
feeling that the court should have heard evidence on value of the
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property at the time Defendant left in 1996. The fact is that
the court did nothing to preclude any such evidence if Defendant
had sought to bring it up. They did make an effort at one point
to bring in an appraisal but when it was objected to as hearsay,
which it obviously was, no further effort to establish value was
made.
Defendant coula have supboenaed the appraiser to make his
appraisal non-hearsay and to allow for cross-examination, but she
did not do so, at her own risk. A fair reading of Defendant's
Memorandum makes it clear that what they are asking for in fact
is a new trial and the opportunity to present new evidence. They
are seeking a second bite of the apple and asking for things that
would most definitely require a new trial and the presenting of
new evidence and the counter-arguing of the same by Plaintiff.
It appears that Defendant, knowing she had no good case for
requesting a New Trial, has tried to boot strap this matter with
an appeal to the more vague Rule 59e, which in any event should
not apply either.
c. Finally, procedurally, this motion of Defendant may seek
to be construed as a Motion to Reconsider. Although there is no
provision in the Rules for a Motion to Reconsider, the case law
seems to support the position and states that a judge certainly
has the right to reconrider any ruling or decision he has made
BEFORE IT IS REDUCED 1^ A FINAL ORDER OR JUDGMENT. (Ron Shepherd
Ins. vs. Shields, 882 P.2nd 650, p.654).
This period between ruling and final order is not unfairly
short in this matter due to Defendants counsel's own actions of
failing to sign off or object to the proposed judgment. At least
a month or more passed from Ruling to final entry of judgment.

BASED on the foregoing procedural defects, Plaintiff would
request that Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment be denied.

4

Substantive defects:
2. The essence of Defendants argument appears to be that
the court erred in deciding that the best means of determining
equity with the facts before it was to determine the amount of
mortgage reduction ana oplit that value between the parties.
Defendant suggests that the court overlooked or made a mistake in
not seeing the obvious need to establish a value on the home as
of 1996 (or 2000, it is unclear in defendant's motion), to
determine what, if any, equity increase there has been over and
above the mortgage reduction.
The logical defect in Defendant's reasoning however, is that
it neglects the fact that the court is limited in it's ruling and
decision making to the facts presented, and that it is the
responsibility of the litigants to put forth the facts needed to
prove and support their case, This is not the court's
responsibility. As described above, only one effort by Defendant
was made to present any evidence as to value and it was obvious
hearsay and in improper form as testimony through no fault of
Plaintiff or of the court. Nor was the need for further
opportunity to put forth evidence on this point discussed or
raised by Defendant at trial or during closing arguments.
Contrary to the intimation of Defendant's motion, the Court
did not overlook the difficultires of valuation, or simply forget
them. Rather the court specifically discussed the difficulty of
valuation based on the evidence place before it and addressed
this problem in it's ruling and determined, based on the evidence
before it, what the most logical and judicious manner of
determining equity would be.
In addition, Defendant's proposed new findings of having the
property appraised and sold and the equity as it exists now
divided between the parties, is simply harking back to her
position in her answer and as taken at trial that somehow this is
5

a partnership with fiduciary responsibility on Plaintiff to hold
the property for Defendant.
It ignores the fact that the court
has ruled on those issues, has determined that it should be
equity as it stood in 1996 at the time of separation of the
parties, and that equity must be determined based on the evidence
before the court and only that evidence.
Reading what defendant
is requesting as an "amendment" to the judgment one wonders why
we even had a trial. It is obvious they want to start over.
In discussing Rule 60b, which is closely related to what
Defendant is attempt^i*g by citing rule 59e, (i.e. mistake,
inadvertance, etc.), the Utah Supreme court said the following:
" This rule brings into conflict competing interests in the
finality of judgments and relief from inequitable judgments. A
motion to modify a final judgment is addressed to the discretion
of the trial court, the exercise of which must be based on sound
legal principles in light of all relevant circumstances. The
court's determination may be reversed only upon a showing that
this discretion was abused. In addition to the conerns that
final judmgnts should not be lightly disturbed and that unjust
judgments should ot be allowed to stand, other factors the court
should consider are whether rule 60(b) is being used as a
substitute for appeal, whether the movant had a fair opportunity
to make his objection at trial, and whether the motion was made
within a reaonslbe time after entry of judgment." Laub v. South
Central Utah Telephone, 657 P.2d 1304, at 1306 (Utah 1982).
It is Plaintiff's position that the motion of Defendant is
an improper substitute for appeal and fails in that it is utterly
devoid of any sufficient reasoning or logic to show that this
court abused it's discretion or that the pausity of any crucial
evidence as may be ir support of Defendant's case was not
Defendant's fault solely, and unobjected to at trial.

IN CONCLUSION, based on the procedural defects in
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Defendant's Motion, and based on the substantive failings of the
position taken by Defendant's, Plaintiff would request that
Defendant's motion be denied and that Plaintiff be awarded costs
incurred in defending this motion in the amount of $250 if this
matter is retolved without hearing or such other greater
reasonable sum as the court may find appropriate if hearing is
required.
DATED this// day of August, 2000.

Ralph C. Anu?€V

Donald D. Gilbert
Attorneys for Plaintiff

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Objection to Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Memorandum
was mailed, postage prepaid, this /j^day of August, 2000, to
Howard Chuntz, Attorney for Defendant, at 1149 West Center, Orem,
Utah, 84057.
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